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Abstract: The Digital Millennium Copyright Act provided
Internet service providers with more certainty regarding
liability for copyright infringement, and copyright owners
with an increased ability to protect their rights on the
Internet in the form of notice and takedown procedures.
While both purposes of the DMCA seem to have been
attained, hindsight reveals that the rights of end users on
the Internet have not fared as well. This Note documents
instances of misuse and abuse of the notice and takedown
procedures and discusses the economic disadvantage that
end users often experience when deciding how to respond to
takedown notices. It argues that the § 512(f) knowing
misrepresentation cause of action, which acts as an
important safeguard against takedown abuse, has been
undermined by judicial interpretation, and suggests a
return to its pre-Rossi interpretation. It is also suggested
that an attorney general (fees and costs) provision for
vindicators of fair use rights be amended to the DMCA to
further define the contours of fair use on the Internet,
protect disadvantaged end users, and eliminate takedown
issuances for marginal economic uses.
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INTRODUCTION
Many of you reading this Note have ample experience posting
content to the Internet on sites such as YouTube, Facebook, and eBay.
Many people are not aware of the extensive procedural system that
operates behind the scenes for the benefit of copyright owners and the
service providers that run those popular sites. Usually, most users can
go about their business without running into any copyright issues.
Unfortunately for others, their experiences have been different, and
they are all too familiar with the notice and takedown provisions of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
Imagine you want to share video of your dancing one-year-old
baby with your parents, who live in another state. These days, most
people would simply upload the video to YouTube and tell their
parents to log on and check it out. But beware when you do-and turn
off all of the radios playing in the background during the video! The
artist whose song is playing in the background might just demand that
YouTube make your baby stop dancing! Furthermore, YouTube will
comply, and your video will be unavailable for ten days or more-you
might even be sued in federal court. For you, the DMCA takedown
procedures have, at best, become a nuisance. For others, abusive or
disruptive takedown practices can be a serious problem affecting one's
livelihood or stifling free speech. This situation and others like it are
explored below, as well as actions that can be taken to alleviate some
of these problems without seriously affecting a copyright holder's
ability to protect their commercial interests online.
Relevant laws governing the notice and takedown procedures
contained in Title II of the DMCA are first outlined in Part I of the
Note. Specifically, the first section discusses the legislative history of
the act and the technical requirements of the notice and takedown
procedures. The second section highlights the specific protections
reserved for individual end users' rights as consumers and users of
copyrighted works in the digital age. The particular contours of end
users' rights are far from crystal clear; the rest of the section addresses
this by highlighting the sparse amount of judicial commentary on §
512(f).
Part II of this paper discusses some of the more recent and well-
publicized instances in which there has been significant public
discourse regarding the DMCA takedown notice procedures and their
effectiveness. It focuses on examples of perceived problems with the
manner in which the takedown provisions operate and analyzes them
in light of the balance of protection the statute affords. It will also
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discuss the concerns related to these problems in the context of
copyright law and its place in our society.
Part III outlines my two-tiered proposal; the first section advises
courts to adopt an objective standard of knowledge under the § 512(f)
misrepresentation provision. The second section illustrates the
advantages of amending the DMCA to include a private attorney
general provision applicable to the vindication of fair use rights. With
these changes, the DMCA can be championed as a law that
strengthens all parties' positions, favoring no one and helping all.
Users will be free to post material on the Internet without fear of
harassment and will have the benefit of a more well-defined fair use
doctrine; Internet Service Providers ("ISPs"') will remain safely
moored in their harbors; and copyright owners will continue to have
the ability to respond quickly to serious infringement in the digital
age.
I. THE LAW
Before the significance of the DCMA takedown procedures and
current practices can be fully understood, it is necessary to detail the
history of the Act itself. Thus, this section will present a brief
summary of the legislative history of Title II of the DMCA, the notice
and takedown provisions contained therein, and their impact on ISPs,
copyright holders, and end users. It will then explore the relevant
judicial decisions impacting the protections afforded to end users,
copyright holders, and ISPs under § 512.
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DMCA
During the 199os, the United States Congress began to investigate
remedies for the prediction that the copyright laws in their then-
current states would provide an inadequate framework to handle the
digital transmission and availability of copyrighted works on the
Internet.2 The premise was that, absent legislative intervention,
copyright law would fail to protect copyrighted works in a manner that
would "make digital networks safe places to disseminate and exploit"
' Throughout this Note, any reference to an ISP should be regarded as a reference to an
entity meeting the requirements found in § 512. Its definition is not restricted to providers
of Internet connections, but to those providing online services as well (also referred to as
"OSPs" or Online Service Providers).
2 S. REP. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998).
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such works.3 Digital networks were, by default, dangerous places for
copyrighted works to exist because of the ease with which digital
works could be copied and distributed.4 Without enhanced
protection, copyright owners would hesitate to make their works
available online.5 By achieving a higher level of protection for
copyrighted works in this new medium, the public would also benefit
through the increase in the availability of works-"the fruit of
American creative genius"-via the Internet. 6
However, copyright owners were not the only constituency that
had difficulty with the implementation of copyright law on the
Internet. The Senate acknowledged, with sympathy, the uncertainty
faced by many ISPs during this burgeoning period of the Internet,
citing Netcom,7 Playboy,8 and Marobie-FL9 as examples of conflicting
case law on the issue of ISP copyright infringement liability.10
Congress recognized that ISPs experienced a high level of risk for both
direct and secondary copyright infringement simply because of the
nature of the operation of a digital network, and that this heightened
3 Id.
4Id. at 8.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 2. The report also noted that a stronger international standard would "encourage
the continued growth of the existing off-line global marketplace for copyrighted works in
digital format." Id. at 8.
7 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Commc'ns Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (finding no ISP secondary liability from user acts). The DMCA "essentially codifies
the result" of Netcom. H.R. Rep. No. 105-551 pt. 1, at 11 (1998).
8 Playboy Enter. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (finding ISP secondarily
liable for infringing material posted by user).
9 Marobie-FL v. Nat'l Assn. of Fire Equip. Distrib., 983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(finding no ISP secondary liability from user acts).
lo S. REP. No. 105-19o, at 19 (citing the cases supra notes 7-9). ISPs can be held liable for
copyright infringement, not just by violating a plaintiffs exclusive right directly, but in
circumstances where the ISP "'did not tak[e] part in the final act' of infringement." Mike
Scott, Safe Harbors Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL'Y 99, 104 (2005-2OO6) (quoting Sony Corp. ofAm. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 436 (1984) (quoting Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 63 (1911)). This
occurs is the context of "an 'ongoing relationship' between a direct infringer and a non-
acting party" where the non-acting party is in a position to control the activity of the non-
acting party. Id.
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risk level would translate into underinvestment in expanding the
speed and capacity of the Internet." While ultimately concluding that
the contours of secondary liability were best fleshed out in the courts,
Congress created a set of safe harbors that would potentially shield
ISPs from liability (regardless of the standard for secondary liability
reached in the courts).12 An ISP qualifies for limited liability by
showing that it is a qualified service provider under § 512(k)(1) and
that the infringing activity for which it is accused is an activity
described in § 512(a), (b), (c), (d), or (g).13 Subsections (a)-(d) define
the four types of activities for which safe harbors are provided: "(a)
providing Internet access; (b) system caching or temporary storage of
material; (c) passive storage or hosting of material posted by others;
and (d) providing location tools."14 The fifth subsection, subsection
(g), limits liability for any type of ISP when it removes or replaces
copyrighted material that is the subject of a DMCA notice or counter
notice.15
B. DMCA STATUTORY NOTICE AND TAKEDOWN PROVISIONS
By providing ISPs with safe harbors from liability, Congress
intended to encourage investment and expansion in the infrastructure
of the Internet.' 6 However, Congress also recognized that by doing so,
it might be disincentivizing ISPs from taking proactive measures to
counteract copyright infringement.17 Congress thus introduced the
notice and takedown procedures into the DMCA as a tool to
1 S. REP. No. 105-190, at 8.
12 Id. at 19. The DMCA is not intended to modify the existence of liability with respect to
judicial interpretations of any copyright infringement doctrines; instead it operates to limit
monetary liability in the event that an ISP is found liable for infringement, provided that
the ISP has satisfied the prerequisites of the Act for the given activity for which it claims
safe harbor protection. H. REP. No. 105-796, at 73 (1998). Injunctive relief is limited for
qualifying ISPs to the extent specified in § 5120). Id.
13 H. REP. No. 105-190, at 73.
14 Edward Lee, Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors, 32 COLUM. J.L. &ARTS 233, 235 (2009).
15 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(1), (4) (2006).
16 S. REP. No. 105-19o, at 1-2.
'7 See id. at 20.
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strengthen copyright holders' ability to protect their rights on the
Internet.18
The basics of the notice and takedown procedures begin with the
requirements set forth in § 512(c); an ISP must meet these in order to
qualify for the limited liability provided by the Act. 19 An ISP will
qualify under this safe harbor if it: (1) is unaware of the infringing
material;20 (2) does not receive a direct financial benefit from the
infringing activity;21 (3) acts expeditiously to disable access to the
material upon notice of the alleged infringement by the copyright
owner;22 (4) maintains an agent for receiving DMCA notices
designated with the Copyright Office;23 and (5) adopts and reasonably
implements a policy providing for the termination of repeat
infringers. 24 Thus, to maintain limited liability under the safe harbor,
an ISP must respond to a notice provided by the copyright owner. 25 A
statutory notification of infringing material is to include substantially:
(i) a signature; (ii) identification of the copyright work; (iii)
identification of the allegedly infringing material and information
reasonably sufficient to assist in locating the material; (iv) the
complaining party's contact information; (v) a statement that the
complaining party has a good faith belief that the use of the material is
not authorized by the owner or by law; and (vi) a statement that the
information in the notice is accurate under penalty of perjury.26
18 Id.
19 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). This Note will focus on situations in which the alleged infringing
material was passively stored by the ISP at the direction of a user. It is under these
circumstances that the majority of disputes involving DMCA notice practice arise. See
discussion, See infra discussion accompanying notes 104-51. The notice and takedown
provisions extend, however, to other safe harbor activities. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(2)(E),
(d)(3). The proposals presented in this Note are intended to extend to all safe harbor
activities subject to DMCA notice provisions.
2o Id. § 512(c)(1)(A).
21 Id. § 512(c)(1)(B).
22 Id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
23 Id. § 512(c)(2).
24 Id. § 512(i)(1)(A).
25 Id. § 512(c)(1)(C). Provided, however, that the notice complies "substantially" with §
512(c)(3) regarding its contents. Id. § 512(c)(3)(B).
26 Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)-(i).
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The bare minimum amount of information that a notice is
required to contain to spur the ISP into action is identification of the
copyrighted work, identification of the allegedly infringing material,
and the complainant's contact information ((ii), (iii), and (iv) in the
preceding paragraph). 27 The communication must be in written form
and submitted to the ISP's designated agent.28 Assuming a valid
complaining notice, the ISP is required to "expeditiously" remove or
disable access to the claimed infringing material.29 It must also take
"reasonable steps" to "promptly notify" the end user responsible for
posting the material that is the subject of the complaint.30
For example, imagine that a YouTube user uploads an
unauthorized, recently released, music video to her YouTube page.
The YouTube service initially qualifies for the safe harbor from
copyright infringement liability under § 512(c) because, by allowing
users to upload videos to its servers for viewing by others, it passively
stores information at the direction of its users on a system controlled
or operated by YouTube. In the provision of its services, YouTube is
not aware of specific acts of infringement,31 does not receive a direct
financial benefit from the activity, has a reasonable termination policy
for repeat infringers,32 and designates a DMCA agent for receiving
takedown notices from copyright holders.33
27 Id. § 512(c)(3). Subsection (B) contains two provisions which operate together to allow a
complaining notice to be considered against the ISP as evidence of its awareness of the
infringing activity unless it contacts the complaining party "to assist in receipt of
notification that substantially complies" when these three items are included in the notice.
Id. § 512(c)(3)(B). This incentivizes ISPs to act on this minimum amount of information to
cooperate with the rights holder to identify the end user responsible and disable access to
retain limited liability.
28 Id. § 512(c)(3).
29 Id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
30 Id. § 512(g)(2)(A).
31 For the most recent ruling on the "knowledge" standard found in § 512(c)(1)(A), see
Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 3582 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2010).
32 YouTUBE TERMS OF SERVICE, http://www.youtube.com/t/terms (last visited Feb. 15,
2011).
33 AMENDED INTERIM DESIGNATION OF AGENT TO RECEIVE NOTIFICATION OF CLAIMED
INFRINGEMENT, http://www.copyright.gov/onlinesp/agents/y/youtube.pdf (last visited
Feb. 15, 2011).
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The musician's record label may employ several people to search
sites like YouTube for material that they believe infringes on their
clients' copyrights. In this particular example, a record label
employee comes across the user's unauthorized posting of the artist's
music video. The record label then prepares a takedown notice,
setting forth: an identification of the copyrighted work (the music
video or musical work); the claimed infringing material (the user's
posting on YouTube); information reasonably sufficient to permit the
service provider to locate the material (for example, a URL and the
user's account name) and the record label's contact information. In
order for the safe harbor to remain applicable to it, YouTube, upon
receipt of this notice, must work with the record label to identify and
remove access to the claimed infringing material. Usually, this
involves blocking others from viewing the video at issue and providing
notice to the user that YouTube received a takedown notice and
disabled access to the user's content.
After a takedown occurs, the accused end user is given the
opportunity to provide the ISP with a counter notification that, along
with pertinent identifying information, includes a statement that the
user has "a good faith belief' that the notice was the result of a
"mistake or misidentification."34 To maintain limited liability, the ISP
must then "promptly" forward the counter notice to the rights holder
and inform the rights holder that the material will be replaced in ten
business days.35 It also must replace the material ten to fourteen days
following the receipt of the counter notice, unless it receives notice
that the original complainant filed a lawsuit.36
Returning to the example above, assume that the YouTube user
who posted the music video has a valid belief that her use of the
material is legal and authorized. To reverse the disabling of the music
video, she would send a counter notification to YouTube, who then
forwards it on to the music label. The music label then has ten to
fourteen days in which to file a federal lawsuit against the user and
notify YouTube of its actions. After this time period, if YouTube has
not received such a notice, it would repost or enable the material.
34 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3)(A)-(D).
35 Id. § 512(g)(2)(B).
36 Id. § 512(g)(2)(C).
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C. CASE LAW AND SECTION 512(F)
Apart from the notice and takedown procedures that provide
limited liability to ISPs and enhanced protection of copyrighted
works, ISPs, copyright owners, and end users are given another
protection in the form of § 512(f). Section 512(f) creates a cause of
action against anyone who "knowingly materially misrepresents.. .that
[the] material or activity is infringing, or.. .was removed or disabled by
mistake or misidentification."37 The remedies for a violation of this
section include liability for any damages, including costs and attorney
fees.38 Moreover, the cause of action § 512(f) provides is enforceable
against both the end user and the rights holder.39
1. THE DIEBOLD STANDARD
The cases interpreting the knowing material misrepresentation
language of § 512(f), and consequently outlining the scope of its
protection, are few. In 2004, two accused infringers and their ISP
filed a § 512(f) action against Diebold Inc. seeking injunctive,
declaratory, and monetary relief. They alleged that Diebold knowingly
and materially misrepresented that email archives posted on various
websites by the student plaintiffs were infringing.40 The complaint
explicitly included a count alleging a violation of § 512(f).4 1 Diebold
produced electronic voting machines that had been the subject of
contemporaneous criticism regarding the machines' reliability and
verification procedures.42 An email archive containing evidence of
employee-acknowledged problems associated with the machines was
leaked and posted on the Internet by an unknown party sometime in
37 Id. § 512(0.
38 Id.
39 See id.
40 Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
41 Complaint 74-81, Diebold, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (No. C 03-04913 JF).
42 Diebold, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1197.
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2003.43 The student plaintiffs in the case reproduced this archive on
various websites.44
The Diebold court found that the posting of some of the contents
of the email archive was lawful, and that Diebold never identified any
specific emails that contained copyrighted content.45 Explaining the
fair use doctrine's posture in the attempt to ameliorate conflicts
between the First Amendment and copyright laws,46 the court stated it
was "hard to imagine a subject the discussion of which could be more
in the public interest."47 Based on these considerations, the court held
that Diebold used the DMCA to suppress publication of content not
subject to copyright protection.48
After reaching the aforementioned conclusion, the issue was
whether Diebold, through its use of the DMCA to suppress publication
of a non-copyrighted work, knowingly materially misrepresented that
the publication constituted an infringing activity.49 Deciding the issue
as a case of first impression, the court rejected the plaintiffs'
contention that the standard required a DMCA takedown notice
author to have an "objectively measured 'likelihood of success on the
merits"' as one that would "impermissibly chill the rights of copyright
owners."50 It likewise rejected Diebold's interpretation that the
standard should be similar to that imposed under Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It held that the Rule 11 standard was
explicitly different from the standard adopted by Congress under the
statute.51 The court instead, consulting Black's Law Dictionary,
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 1203. This fact is important with respect to the knowledge standard of § 512(t),
because Diebold apparently "acknowledged that at least some of the emails [were] subject
to the fair use doctrine." Id.
46 Id. at 12oo.
47 Id. at 1203. The court also cited the noncommercial character and transformative nature
of the use. Id. For a more thorough discussion of fair use, see generally Pamela
Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2576 (2009)
(comprehensively discussing fair use in U.S. copyright law).
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1204.
50 Id.
[Vol. 7:1
SCHONAUER
interpreted "knowingly" to mean "that a party actually knew, should
have known if it acted with reasonable care or diligence, or would have
had no substantial doubt had it been acting in good faith, that it was
making a misrepresentation."52
Applying this standard, the Diebold court found that "[n]o
reasonable copyright holder could have believed that the portions of
the email archive discussing possible technical problems with
Diebold's voting machines were protected by copyright."53 It found no
genuine issue of material fact that Diebold knew or intended to
prevent publication of the content with DMCA notices.54
Interestingly, the court also cited the fact that Diebold did not file a
lawsuit after sending its takedown notice as evidence that suggested
Diebold used the DMCA improperly.55
The Diebold case set forth the first interpretation of the statutory
standard for § 512(f) liability. The court's findings that: the material
at issue was of great public interest and damaging to Diebold in a
public relations context; no reasonable copyright holder could have
believed that the email archive portions at issue were protected by
copyright; Diebold appeared to have acknowledged that at least some
emails were subject to the fair use doctrine; and that Diebold filed a
takedown notice that was subject to a counter notice and did not bring
suit, collectively demonstrate that Diebold actually knew, or should
have known had it acted with reasonable care, that it was making a
misrepresentation.
2. THE ROSSI STANDARD
Shortly after the Diebold decision, a subsequent Ninth Circuit
decision in Rossi v. Motion Picture Assoc. of Am. Inc seemingly
addressed § 512(f) as well.56 The MPAA was notified of potentially
infringing material on Rossi's website via an anti-piracy detection
program used by one of the MPAA's member companies.5 7 Rossi
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 1204-05; see also infra discussion accompanying note 112.
56 Rossi v. Motion Picture Assoc. of Am. Inc., 391 F.3d 1oo (9th Cir. 2004). The Rossi
court did not reference the Diebold decision in its opinion. See generally id.
57 Id. at 1005.
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received notice from his ISP that his website would be shut down and
he subsequently moved it to another ISP.58  Rossi filed suit,
contending that his website-while advertising that it contained "Full
Length Downloadable Movies"59-did not actually contain any movies
that could be downloaded. 6° Therefore, according to Rossi, the MPAA
could not have had a good faith belief that Rossi was illegally
infringing the MPAA's copyrights because it did not conduct an
investigation into the truth of those statements before issuing a
takedown notice.61
Rossi's suit alleged four counts against the MPAA, none of which
were § 512 actions. 62 The district court found that, because the MPAA
filed properly prepared takedown notices with Rossi's ISP, Rossi could
not prove that the MPAA acted without justification.63 To reach this
conclusion, it was necessary for the court to determine if the MPAA's
takedown notices complied with the requirements found in §
512(c)(3)(A). 64 The court ultimately concluded that the takedown
notices were issued in good faith given Rossi's statements on the
website, and that failing to investigate the matter further did not
deprive the MPAA of the good faith required for an effective takedown
notice. It is worth reiterating here that the effectiveness of the
takedown notice itself was the issue in the case; if the notice was
effective, Rossi could not show that the MPAA acted without
justification, a required element of his case.
The issue was then framed for a de novo review at the appellate
level as a question of whether the MPAA had sufficient information to
s8 Id. at 1002.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 1003.
61 Id. The disposition of Rossi's case turned on whether this "good faith belief" was present.
See infra discussion accompanying note 65.
62 Id. at 1oo2; Complaint 10-35, Rossi v. Motion Picture Assoc. of Am. Inc., No. 02-
00239, 2003 WL 21511750 (D. Haw. April 29, 2003).
63 Rossi, No. 02-00239, 2003 WL 21511750, at *3. Two of Rossi's state claims required
that he prove that the MPAA acted without justification. Id. at *2. The remaining counts
were decided in part based on the reasonableness of the complying DMCA takedown
notice. Id. at *4-5.
64 Id. at *3 (agreeing with the defendants' assertion that "acting pursuant to and in accord
with the DMCA provides the justification required to defeat Plaintiffs tortious interference
claims.").
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form a "good faith belief' that Rossi was infringing the MPAA
copyrights as required under section § 512(c)(3)(A)(v), because the
MPAA did not attempt to download any of the copyrighted works. 65
The court first properly concluded that the "good faith belief'
standard present in § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) was a subjective standard. 66 It
held that "interpretive case law and the statutory structure of § 512(c)"
supported this conclusion. 67 To support this conclusion, the Rossi
court cited several cases interpreting the language "good faith belief'
found in other statutes to be based on a subjective standard. 68
The Rossi court's subsequent support for its holding becomes
fuzzy. First looking to subsection § 512(f) for guidance in interpreting
the good faith belief standard of § 512(c)(3)(A)(v), the court stated
that the "knowing misrepresentation" standard found in § 512(f)
required "a demonstration of some actual knowledge of
misrepresentation." 69 No citation to authority other than § 512(f)
itself was given for this statement, nor was an explanation for this
statement given by the court.70 The Rossi court went on to reason
that, because § 512(f) required a subjective standard of knowledge, it
followed naturally that the good faith belief standard would require a
subjective reading as well.7'
The court found that Rossi failed to raise a genuine issue of fact as
to whether the MPAA violated § 512 requirements because the MPAA
reviewed Rossi's website upon the discovery of potentially infringing
material, and subjectively believed it to contain infringing content. 72
Based on the statements contained on the website (regarding the
presence of infringing material), the MPAA was found to have had a
"good faith belief' as required by the DMCA notice provisions. 73
65 Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1003.
66 Id. at 1004.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 1004-05.
70 Id. at 1005.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. Interestingly, in a footnote, the court implied that the MPAA formed its good faith
belief regardless of the fact that the website was located using an automated content
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3. THE PROPAGATION OF THE Rossi STANDARD
The interpretation of the DMCA provisions in Rossi has been
subsequently propagated to other courts. The year after Rossi was
decided, the District of Colorado had a chance to interpret § 512
provisions in Dudnikov v. MGA Entertainment, Inc, and perhaps
clarify the Rossi decision.74 This, however, did not happen. In the
complaint, plaintiffs alleged that MGA falsely notified eBay that an
item offered for sale by the plaintiffs infringed MGA's copyright, and
that such an act constituted perjury under § 512.75 Thus, the
Dudnikov court faced an express allegation of perjury, presumably as
a violation of § 512(C)(3)(A). The court followed language from Rossi,
holding that the plaintiffs' perjury claim "must be supported by
substantial evidence that MGA knowingly and materially
misrepresented" its infringement claims.76 The court went further to
adopt the Magistrate's determination that there is no general civil
action for perjury, and thus analyzed the plaintiffs' claim under §
512(f), not § 512(c)(3)(A), the perjury provision.77 Unfortunately, the
good faith belief standard of the ISP liability provisions was again
imputed to causes of actions brought under § 512(f).
Once more, in Augusto, the Central District of California imputed
the § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) good faith belief standard to a § 512(f) action.78
Augusto included an express § 512(f) claim of knowing
misrepresentation as a counterclaim in his answer.79 The court stated
that liability under § 512(f) could be found "only if the owner did not
possess a subjective good faith belief that its copyright was being
locator program, because several MPAA employees personally reviewed the website and
determined it to contain infringing material. Id. at n.7. Although not a clear statement by
the court, this footnote seems to suggest that in future cases wherein erroneous notices are
issued as a result of using automated software and without human review, a good faith
belief may not have been formed.
74 Dudnikov v. MGA Entm't Inc., 41o F. Supp. 2d lOlO (D. Colo. 2005).
75 Complaint 17, Dudnikov v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., No. CIV.A.o3-D-2512 (D. Colo.
Dec. 10, 2003). No subsection of § 512 was cited. See id.
76 Dudnikov, 41o F. Supp. 2d at 1012 (citing Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1004-05).
77 Id. I suggest, however, that a claim for perjury does in fact lie in § 512(c)(3)(A). See 17
U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(3)(A)(v)-(vi).
78 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055, lO65 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
79 Answer and Counterclaim 29-35, UMG, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (No. 2:07-cv-31o6).
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infringed." Ultimately, the Augusto court found that the copyright
owner had the requisite good faith belief, and granted the counter-
defendant's motion for summary judgment regarding Augusto's §
5 12(f) counterclaim. 8
°
Shortly thereafter, the Northern District of California compounded
the confusion surrounding the interpretation of § 512(f). In Lenz, the
sole claim in Lenz's complaint against Universal was for
misrepresentation under § 512(f) based on Universal's DMCA notice
to YouTube that resulted in the removal of Lenz's content from the
site.81 Universal moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted under Federal Rule
12(b)(6). 82 The court framed the issue as whether § 512(c)(3)(A)(v)
required a copyright owner "to consider the fair use doctrine in
formulating a good faith belief that 'use of the material in the manner
complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or
the law."' 83 It held that § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) required a copyright owner
to "evaluate whether the material makes fair use of copyright" in order
to proceed with a DMCA takedown notice in good faith.8 4
Therefore, an allegation of bad faith on the part of a copyright
owner in proceeding to issue a takedown notice without first properly
considering the fair use doctrine would be sufficient to state a claim of
misrepresentation under § 512(f). 8 5 Presumably, it would be sufficient
because a finding of actual knowledge of misrepresentation would
naturally follow a bad faith belief finding under § 512(c)(3)(A)(v), thus
creating liability under § 512(f). But this interpretation would seem to
suggest that the third prong of the Diebold knowledge standard-that
the copyright owner "would have no substantial doubt had it been
acting in good faith, that it was making a misrepresentation"-is being
used to find liability under § 512(f). That is, if the copyright owner
acted in bad faith by failing to consider the fair use doctrine before
8o UMG, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 1O65 (citing Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1004-05; Dudnikov, 41o F.
Supp. 2d at 1017).
81 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1153 (N.D. Cal 20o8).
82 Id. A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal would be appropriate only if the Lenz court were to find
that "the complaint lack[ed] a cognizable theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable
legal theory." Id.
83 Id. at 1154.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 1154-55.
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issuing the takedown notice, they would be liable under § 512(t)
regardless of their actual knowledge of the infringing nature of the use
at issue. The Lenz court's decision to uphold Lenz's § 512(f) claim
against Universal's 12(b)(6) motion alone would probably have been
perceived as an increase to end user protection under the DMCA and a
small victory for fair use advocates if not for the court subsequently
removing most of this perceived increase by postulating that, even in
this seemingly egregious case of abuse, it had "considerable doubt that
Lenz will be able to prove that Universal acted with the subjective bad
faith required by Rossi."86 This disconnect might be attributable to
the fact that the Rossi and Lenz decisions were decided on summary
judgment and on a 12(b)(6) motion, respectively. 87 Once again, the
Rossi conflation of the two subsections was not questioned.
The Lenz case was followed by an Eastern District of Wisconsin
case. In this case, the court decided whether the plaintiff made
knowing material misrepresentations about the infringing nature of
the material at issue. 88 Specifically, the plaintiff issued takedown
notices for material that he was ultimately found not to have owned.89
Just as in Augusto, the district court cited Rossi and held that a party
must violate the subjective good faith belief standard of §
512(c)(3)(A)(v) to create liability for misrepresentation under § 512(f)
and therefore dismissed the claim. 90
The Southern District of New York, in Cabell, soon followed suit,
finding "actual knowledge" of misrepresentation to be "a prerequisite
to liability under section 512(f)."91 The Cabell court cited its earlier
Arista Records v. MP3Board92 decision as support for this holding.93
86 Id. at 1156.
87 See Jordan Koss, Protecting Free Speech for Unequivocal Fair Users: Rethinking Our
Interpretation of the § 512(t) Misrepresentation Clause, 28 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 149,
167-68 (2010).
88 Third Educ. Group, Inc. v. Phelps, 675 F. Supp. 2d 916, 919 (E.D. Wis. 2009).
89 Id. at 927.
90 Id.
91 Cabell v. Zimmerman, No. 09-cv-10134, 2010 WL 996007, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2010)
(slip copy).
92 Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., No. o0-cv-466o, 2002 WL 1997918, at *14
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29,2002).
93 Cabell, 2010 WL 996007, at *4.
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However, the earlier Arista court held only that the defendant's
misrepresentation claim must fail because it did not make a
misrepresentation. 94 The defendant's claim in Arista was based on
the fact that the plaintiffs DMCA notice containing a list of infringing
materials included one song that was "authorized to be on the
Internet."95 The general representation made by the plaintiffs was
true-that the listed materials were infringing.96
The case law history regarding the application of § 512(f) by end
users seeking protection from abusive, erroneous, or disruptive DMCA
notices therefore demonstrates that the issue is far from settled in
most circuits, having only appeared at issue before the judiciary in the
Second,97 Seventh,98 Ninth,99 and Tenth1o Circuits. It also suggests
that the precise requirements for a finding of liability under § 512(f)
may have a shaky foundation.
II. THE PROBLEM
The DMCA was enacted largely as a balancing act, attempting to
ease the burden of rights enforcement on the Internet for copyright
owners without simultaneously hindering the growth and
development of electronic commerce. 10 1 In a broad sense, the DMCA
has largely been a success, providing both ISPs and rights holders
with more certainty regarding liability and enhanced protection,
94Arista, 2002 WL 1997918, at *15.
95 Id.
96 Id. ("The presence of one authorized song file does not constitute a material
misrepresentation in light of the facts of this case.").
97 Cabell, 2010 WL 996007 ; Arista, 2002 WL 1997918.
98 Third Educ. Group, Inc. v. Phelps, 675 F. Supp. 2d 916 (E.D. Wis. 2009).
99 Rossi, 391 F.3d lOOO; Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150; UMG, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055; Diebold,
337 F. Supp. 2d 1195.
100 Dudnikov v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., 41o F. Supp. 2d 1OO (D. Colo. 2005).
1l S. REP. No. 1O5-19o, at 8 (1998). See also id. at 2 (primary purpose "to make digital
networks safe places to disseminate and exploit copyrighted materials").
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respectively.102 But, scholars note the compromise struck by this
legislation may not adequately protect the end user or consumer. 10 3
The validity of such concerns manifests in the current practices
involving DMCA takedown procedures. Many recent events involving
copyright owners' use of the DMCA notice and takedown provisions
have garnered significant media attention. Often times, the coverage
of these events calls into question the appropriateness of the
unchecked power inherent in these provisions. This section will
illustrate the perceived problems with the DMCA's inadequate
protection of individual users and discuss its consequences.
A. DMCA ABUSES
The notice and takedown procedures set out in § 512 of the DMCA
are intended to satisfy "the need for rapid response to potential
infringement" on digital networks.104 However, since its enactment,
observers of DMCA takedown practices have decried a plethora of
uses by rights holders as abuse of the process. 10 5 Much of the
criticism focuses on DMCA takedown notices that are sent for reasons
unrelated to copyright enforcement (e.g., to stifle publication or
speech) or notices that go beyond a "rapid response to potential
infringement" (e.g., blatant disregard for the fair use doctrine).1°6
Both criticisms can be categorized as perceived overreaching and can
be-and often are-intertwined.
102 Lisa Peets & Mark Young, Internet Piracy lo Years On, 1 LANDSLIDE 40,41 (2009);
David Kravets, lo Years Later, Misunderstood DMCA is the Law that Saved the Web,
WIRED, (Oct. 27, 2008, 3:01 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2oo8/io/ten-years-
later ("Today's internet is largely an outgrowth of the much-reviled Digital Millennium
Copyright Act that lawmakers passed in 1998, and President Clinton signed into law
exactly a decade ago Tuesday.").
103 Kathleen O'Donnell, Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. and the Potential Effect of Fair Use
Analysis Under the Takedown Procedures of§ 512 of the DMCA, 2009 DuKE L. & TECH.
REV. 010, 20 (2009). The author notes that the protection afforded to end users "grants
the benefit of doubt to the copyright holder in a way that significantly impairs fair use on
the Internet." Id. 13. See also Koss, supra note 87, at 151.
104 S. REP. NO.105-190, at 21 (1998).
105 One particularly outspoken critic and public watchdog has been the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, who maintains a "Takedown Hall of Shame." Takedown Hall of Shame,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, http://www.eff.org/takedowns (last visited Feb. 15,
2011).
1o6 See infra discussion accompanying notes 107-36.
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Lenz v. Universal is a good contemporaneous example of a dispute
involving a DMCA takedown notice.17 The case began when
Universal sent a DMCA takedown notice to YouTube demanding that
they remove a twenty-nine second video clip that contained
approximately twenty seconds of the Prince song "Let's Go Crazy."'1 8
The song played in the background while mother Stephanie Lenz
filmed her young children dancing around the room asking, "what do
you think of the music?"19 The opinion notes that the song can be
heard, "albeit with some difficulty given the poor sound quality of the
video."" 0 Many commentators expressed indignation that a DMCA
notice was used to remove content from the web in a case in which
many agree was probably a fair use of the copyrighted work."' And,
while in no way a concession that Lenz's use was fair, the fact that
Universal did not file a lawsuit in response to Lenz's counter notice-
resulting in the subsequent restoration of her video prior to the
commencement of her case against Universal-is telling.112
Another incident provides an example of misuse of the DMCA
takedown procedures in which the party issuing the DMCA takedown
notices did not own the works contained in the notices."3 The
misrepresentation was so egregious that the fact that the uses of the
107 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1150.
108 Id. at 1151-52.
109 Id.
11o Id. at 1152.
1-1 Samuelson, supra note 47, at 2575-76 (describing the facts of the Lenz case as a
hypothetical noninfringing incidental fair use). Many avid bloggers, reporters, and
activists also expressed strong views that Lenz's use was fair. E.g., Mike Masnick, Film
Your Kid Dancing to a McDonald's Happy Meal CD...Get a Takedown Notice from
Google, TECHDIRT (Dec. 30, 2009, 12:19 PM).
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/2oo9123o/o252517545.shtml; Prince Tries to Bury
"Dancing Baby" Clip, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION,
http://www.eff.org/takedowns/prince-tries-bury-dancing-baby-clip (last visited Feb. 15,
2011).
112 See Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1152; see also supra discussion accompanying note 55.
113 Diehl v. Crook, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, http://www.eff.org/cases/diehl-v-
crook (last visited Feb. 15, 2011). The fact that the DMCA notice issuer did not own a
copyright in the materials is similar to the fact situation in Diebold discussed at supra note
40. It is not clear from the known facts whether a colorable claim of joint copyright
ownership in an interview was legitimate. But see infra discussion accompanying notes
114-17.
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work in question were clearly fair was not even raised.114 In this case,
several websites posted altered screenshots of a Fox News interview in
which the defendant Michael Crook participated.115 The altered
screenshots made fun of and ridiculed Crook for his political views.116
Crook subsequently issued takedown notices to the complainants'
ISPs, and many of their websites or portions of them were disabled.117
Crook had no valid claim to the rights in the Fox News screenshots,
and merely used the DMCA procedures to stifle free speech.
This trend does not appear to be slowing, even in the wake of the
Lenz decision, which was viewed as a small victory for fair use
advocates. Recently, a Boston weatherman made an off-color joke
during a live news broadcast.1, 8 The WHDH station, while attempting
to explain the statement as a technical problem with the monitor,
simultaneously issued takedown notices to ISP hosting sites that
posted or linked to the video."9 Around the same time period, the
Archers Daniel Midland Company (ADM) issued takedown notices to
stifle an edited version of a staged interview with ADM's CEO Patricia
Woertz. 120 The video made it appear as if ADM were an evil
multinational corporate conglomerate planning world domination
through exploitation.121 Professor Friedman, who viewed the video at
114 See Complaint, Diehl v. Crook, No. Co6-o68oo SBA (N.D. Cal. 2007), available at
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/diehl-v-erook/crook-Complaint.pdf.
115 Diehl v. Crook, supra note 113.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Weather Man Makes Joke about His 9 Inches.flv, YoUTUBE.COM,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=37JVmudfpWU&feature=related (last visited Apr. 16,
2010).
119 Justin Silverman, Pete Bouchard and the Battle Against Bogus Takedowns, CrIZEN
MEDIA LAW PROJECr (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/2o1o/pete-
bouchard-and-battle-against-bogus-takedowns.
120 Peter Friedman, Archers Daniel Midland Abuses Copyright Law to Censor Criticism-
Corporations Have the Right to Free Speech, But Not People Who Criticize Them?,
RULING IMAGINATION: LAW AND CREATIVITY (Feb. 4, 2010),
http://blogs.geniocity.com/friedman/2o1o/o2/archers-daniel-midland-abuses-copyright-
law-to-censor-criticism.
121 Id.
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issue (it cannot currently be found as of this writing), labeled ADM's
actions as "outright copyright abuse."122
Putting aside for a moment situations in which a copyright
owner's motivation for issuing takedown notices seems to be at odds
with the spirit of the DMCA, another potential problem arises.
Copyright ownership can be enjoyed by a diverse range of entities,
from an individual to an LLC, and all the way up to a large, complex,
multinational corporation. It appears that instances of mistakenly
issued DMCA takedown notices have begun to catch the public's
watchful eye and may indeed prove just as harmful.
In one recent example, the Internet was abuzz after Google deleted
several blogs from its Blogger site, citing its repeat infringer policy.123
Apparently, Google deleted the blogs largely in response to a bevy of
DMCA notices received from the International Federation of the
Phonographic Industry.24 While no one is rushing to claim that
music blogs are always compliant with copyright laws, there were
claims that some of the takedown notices were issued mistakenly.
One blogger claimed that all of the material on his blog labeled as
infringing in the DMCA takedown notices came directly from a
promotional company, label, or artist.125 For that particular blogger,
the DMCA notice that broke the camel's back (i.e., led to the
implementation of Blogger's three-strike termination policy) was in
response to a post that contained no infringing material.12 6 That
particular article contained a link to an mp3 file that had been
deactivated months before. 127
The Blogger incident demonstrates how, in large organizations-
and indeed, even in small operations-mistakes can be made that lead
to the issuance of DMCA notices that clearly should not have been
122 Id.
123 Nate Anderson, The Day the Music Blogs Died: Behind Google's Musicblogocide, ARS
TECHNICA (Feb. 15, 201o, 6:24 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/201o/2/the-day-the-musi-blgs-died-behind-googles-musicblogcide.ars.
"4 For example, one of the music blogs, livingears, was included in seventeen DMCA
notices from IFPI over a six month period. Chilling Effects Clearinghouse: Search the
Database, CHILLING EFFECrS,
https://www.chillingeffects.org/search.cgi?search=livingears (last visited Feb. 15, 2011).
125 Anderson, supra note 123.
126 Id.
127 Id.
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issued. It can be as simple as the marketing department of a record
label not informing the legal department that a particular copyrighted
work has been sent to a music blogger for posting and commenting on
its blog. In fact, viral marketing is experiencing an upward trend in
today's new user generated content (UGC) universe, making it even
more difficult to determine whether or not a use is infringing.128
Increasingly, copyright owners look to automate solutions to the
demanding task of policing the Internet for infringing uses of their
works.129 Viacom, apparently utilizing such an automated method,
included in a large batch of DMCA notices to YouTube, a notice that a
video tutorial demonstrating an open source engine developed by the
poster infringed one of its copyrights. 130 The open source 3D engine,
used to develop 3D applications, was developed independently from
anything related to Viacom material and dubbed "The Irrlicht
Project."131 Nevertheless, Viacom's copyright infringement machine
picked up the YouTube home video demonstration and sent a DMCA
takedown notice.132 Since Viacom did not include a reference to the
work it believed was being infringed, some speculate that it was a 1972
album by Klaus Schulze.133 Whatever the cause, it seems clear that
the DMCA notice was issued by mistake. No valid claim of
infringement could stand, and consequently the material was
restored.134 There has also been speculation that the DMCA notice
issued in the Lenz case was similarly the result of an automated
process.135
128 Maria Lilld Montagnani, A New Interface Between Copyright Law and Technology:
How User-Generated Content Will Shape the Future of Online Distribution, 26 CARDozo
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 719, 766-68 (2009).
129 See, e.g., Elvin Lee, ViaCom's Dragnet Catches a Few "Dolphins," CHILLING EFFECrS
(Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.chillingeffects.org/weather.cgi?WeatherID=58o.
130 Id.
131 IRRLICHT ENGINE - A FREE OPEN SOURCE 3D ENGINE, http://irrlicht.sourceforge.net (last
visited Feb. 15, 2011) "Irrlicht" is the German equivalent of "will-o'-the-wisp." IRRLICHT
ENGINE, http://irrlicht.sourceforge.net/faq.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2011).
132 Lee, supra note 129.
133 Id.
134 Id.
'35 Michael S. Sawyer, Filters, Fair Use & Feedback: User-Generated Content Principles
and the DMCA, 24 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 363, 379 (2009).
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While seemingly innocuous at first glance, mistaken takedown
notices can, as demonstrated by the examples above, be just as fraught
with problems as the aforementioned abuses of the DMCA
procedures. Nor are mistaken DMCA notices something that are
limited to large rights holders; it is in fact a problem common enough
that one author of a website dedicated to reducing plagiarism on the
Internet wrote that he receives a message related to authors sending
faulty DMCA notices on a near daily basis.136 With these cautionary
examples in mind, the remainder of this section attempts to explain
why the protections created by Congress for end users are insufficient.
B. UNBALANCED PROTECTIONS
Together, the synergy created by simultaneously giving copyright
owners new mechanisms with which to assert their rights and
providing limited liability safe harbors from copyright infringement
for ISPs was meant to "facilitate the robust development and world-
wide expansion of electronic commerce, communications, research,
development, and education in the digital age."137 The overall affect
that the DMCA has had on the Internet seems to be a positive one.138
But, what about the rights of individual end users?
The Senate Report mentions-almost in passing-the interests of
individual users on three separate occasions. The first instance is in
the discussion section of the report, pointing out an amendment that
was reached after three months of negotiations among major
copyright owners and ISPs to provide "important procedural
protections.. .to ensure [users] will not be mistakenly denied access" to
the Internet.139 It then discusses the (now) § 5 12(f) provision,
observing that it is meant to deter knowingly false allegations as they
are detrimental to copyright owners, ISPs, and individual end
users.140 The report further contemplates that the § 512(g) provision
provides a mechanism for end users to respond to infringing
136 Jonathan Bailey, Top 5 DMCA Mistakes, PLAGIARISM TODAY (Aug. 6, 2009),
http://www.plagiarismtoday.com/2oo9/o8/o6/top-5-dma-mistakes.
137 S. REP. No. 105-19o, at 1-2 (1998).
138 See Kravets, supra note 102.
139 S. REP. No. 105-19o, at 9 (Note that the focus here is not on protecting speech or
expression, but merely access.).
14o Id. at 49.
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complaints.141 Finally, the report points to the Ashcroft-Leahy-Hatch
Amendment adopted to ensure reasonable notice to users and provide
an opportunity to respond to infringement complaints (the counter
notice provisions).142 Nowhere does the report attempt to quantify or
contemplate the potential harm to end users that could result from
overreaching on the part of rights holders.143
These observations are reinforced when one considers the
underrepresentation of the end users' interests during DMCA
negotiations.144 In the early stages of the construction of the DMCA
and its predecessor bills, Senate hearings were "supplemented by a
series of negotiations" between copyright owners and ISPs regarding
the scope of liability for infringing activity.145 This necessarily
involved the notice and takedown regime, clearly affecting end users'
interests-yet representatives of that constituency were
underrepresented in the negotiations. For several months prior to the
introduction of the DMCA as S. 1121, Chairman Hatch presided over
"comprehensive negotiations"-again between copyright owners and
ISPs to the exclusion of end users-involving ISP liability under the
act.146 The Senate Report's discussion of Title II concludes with the
observation that it "preserves strong incentives" for rights holders and
ISPs to "detect and deal with copyright infringements" while
simultaneously providing certainty concerning ISP liability.147 Again,
there does not appear to be much concern for the effect the law would
have on end users.
141 Id. at 49-51. See also supra discussion accompanying notes 34-36.
142 S. REP. No. 105-190, at 67.
143 Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or "Chilling Effects"? Takedown
Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium CopyrightAct, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 635 (2006) ("no extended discussion arose concerning
the implications.., the removal procedure might have on freedom of expression... or due
process").
144 Senator Ashcroft expressed his view that the original bill, devoid of counter notice
provisions, "provided little or no protection for an Internet user wrongfully accused of
violating the copyright laws." 144 CONG. REC. S4884-1, 4889 (May 14, 1998) (statement
of Sen. Ashcroft).
145 S. REP. No. 105-19o, at 4.
146 Id. at 7.
147 Id. at 20.
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The unbalanced result of this oversight has not gone unnoticed.
Scholars argue that the protections in the notice and takedown
provisions tip in favor of rights holders and ISPs, observing that
"[p]rotections for the target of the notice" (the end user) are "relatively
few."'148 Of particular concern is the degree to which the inadequate
protection of end users in the DMCA has enabled rights holders to
significantly "impair fair use on the Internet."149 One author
concludes that "[c]opyright holders have free license to target fair
users."150 A comprehensive study of DMCA takedown notices
archived by Chilling Effects reveals that a great many of notices have
significant procedural or substantive flaws, and that takedown notices
have been issued in "numerous questionable situations."151 Others
have noted the threat posed to free speech rights by abusive takedown
notices.152 These observations and conclusions are troubling, to say
the least.
The limited liability provided to ISPs incentivizes unjustified
takedowns on the part of the ISP,153 and users are thus left with the
recourse of issuing a counter notice per § 512(g). Even this protection
afforded to end users is underutilized, given the costs involved. 154
While in some cases the copyright holder may not continue to pursue
the issue, some noted that even the short time period the materials
will be absent from the Internet can be significant in the case of
expressive materials.155 The danger is the "potential diminution in the
148 Urban & Quilter, supra note 143, at 628.
149 O'Donnell, supra note 103, 13.
150 Malla Pollack, Rebalancing Section 512 to Protect Fair Users from Herds of Mice -
Trampling Elephants, or a Little Due Process is Not Such a Dangerous Thing, 22 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 547,561 (2006).
151 Urban & Quilter, supra note 143, at 681.
152 Koss, supra note 87, at 151.
153 Joshua Urist, Who's Feeling Lucky? Skewed Incentives, Lack of Transparency, and
Manipulation of Google Search Results Under the DMCA, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.
209, 224 (2006).
154 Andre Menko Bleech, What's the Use? Good Faith Evaluations of 'Fair Use' and Digital
Millennium Copyright Act 'Takedown'Notices, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 241, 257
(2009).
155 Urban & Quilter, supra note 143, at 636-37
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value of calls to protest, competitive pricing, or newsworthy
articles."156
In situations where the copyright holder responds to a counter
notice by filing a federal lawsuit, the end user is often at a severe
economic disadvantage.157 The target of a takedown notice can have a
legitimate fair use defense, but the fear of being subjected to a federal
lawsuit and the costs involved may lead many end users to simply
allow the material at issue to remain disabled. This is evident from
the "small number of users that actually challenge a takedown notice
or pursue claims for improper removal or delayed restoration."158
Nonprofit groups like Electronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF") are
helpful in this context, as they provide pro bono representation and
counseling to end users.159 But as even they acknowledge, they "do
not have the resources to defend everyone who asks."160
Despite Congress's lip service to end user concerns in the statutory
history, it is clear that it can be frustrating for the victims of DMCA
takedown notice abuses to find redress for their troubles. Especially
bothersome is the fact that some members of the judiciary recognize
that the purpose of § 512(f) is to prevent such abuse,161 yet decisions
like Rossi have muted the efforts to correctly interpret one of the few
statutory provisions that have a chance to level the playing field for
end users. The remainder of this Note discusses potential solutions to
the problems outlined above.
III. PROPOSAL
The abuses described above-and others-should be quelled, and
end users deserve to have their interests better represented in the
DMCA. Some suggest an outright repeal of § 512, advocating instead a
156 Id.
157 Bleech, supra note 154.
158 Id.
159 CONTACT EFF, http://www.eff.org/about/contact (last visited Feb. 15, 2011).
16o Id.
16, Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1156 ("The purpose of Section 512(f) is to prevent the abuse of
takedown notices.").
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"strong universal safe harbor for ISPs."162 Others suggest codification
of a digital fair use provision to increase end user confidence when
assessing the appropriateness of their use.163 The goal of the present
proposal is to allow the DMCA to operate much in the same manner as
it currently does, and seeks merely to adjust the liabilities and
incentive structure to yield more desirable protections for end users
without compromising the robust protections provided to ISPs and
copyright holders.
My proposal envisions a twofold improvement of the DMCA: (1)
courts should construe the knowing misrepresentation language as a
"known or should have known" standard in § 512(f) actions, similar to
the standard adopted in Diebold; and (2) a statutorily imposed
mandatory attorney's fees and costs provision should make available
financial assistance to those who vindicate fair use rights.
A. SHOULD HAVE KNOWN STANDARD
The first part of the proposal envisions an express adoption of the
knowing misrepresentation standard of § 512(f) as interpreted by the
Diebold court, or, alternatively, an amendment to the statute to
ensure that end users are adequately protected from overexposure to
DMCA takedown notice risks.
It should first be made clear that, as a starting point, the legislative
history of the DMCA indicates that Congress viewed § 512(c)(3) as
having a distinct purpose from § 512(f). According to the Senate
Report, § 512(c)(3)(A) sets forth the procedures that copyright owners
must follow to provide effective notice of the infringement of their
works. 164 Section 512(c)(3)(B) describes the effect of noncompliant
notices, and their effects on an ISP's limited liability protections.165
Section 512(f), on the other hand, "establishes a right of action against
any person who knowingly misrepresents" the infringing nature of the
use of a work.166 The subsection is "intended to deter knowingly false
allegations to service providers in recognition that such
162 Urban & Quilter, supra note 143, at 688 (noting that such a change is unlikely, and
discussing out reform possibilities instead).
163 Pollack, supra note 150, at 565-72.
164 S. REP. No. 105-190, at 45.
165 Id. at 46-47.
166 Id. at 49.
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misrepresentations are detrimental to rights holders, service
providers, and Internet users."167 One author suggests that the
copyright owner's good faith determination of the legality of the use of
the posted material is, "at most, a factor related to burden shifting in
attributing knowledge or awareness to a service provider."168 The
legislative intent and separate consideration of the two provisions is
important, because it shows that there is little support for Rossi's
juxtaposition of the two standards.
The reasoning behind the Rossi decision is flawed. Nowhere in the
DMCA does it state or imply that the knowing misrepresentation
standard prerequisite to § 512(f) liability is dependent upon a
violation of the good faith belief requirement of § 512(c)(3)(A)(v). In
fact, the § 512(c)(3)(A) requirements are merely the elements that
must be present in a takedown notice for it to be considered effective
under § 512(c)(3). 16 9 The effectiveness of a takedown notice affects
two other provisions of subsection (c): (1) when a notice triggers the
obligation of an ISP to expeditiously disable access to claimed
infringing material;17° and (2) when a notice that does not rise to the
level required to trigger the obligation of an ISP may be weighed as
evidence of an ISP's general knowledge of infringing activity under §
512(c)(1)(A).171
To construe the statute as the Rossi Court did is a de facto
evisceration of the knowing misrepresentation standard entirely from
§ 512(f)172-and for no reason. If the Rossi reading is correct, the
knowledge standard of § 512(f) becomes redundant. A copyright
holder having actual knowledge of its misrepresentation could not
possibly be found to have the good faith required under §
512(c)(3)(A). An act that violates Rossi's "actual knowledge of
misrepresentation" standard articulated for § 512(f) cannot be made
in good faith, making acts that violate § 512(f) at least a subset of the
acts that violate § 512(c)(3)(A)(v). Conversely, a notice found
167 Id.
168 Bleech, supra note 154, at 262.
169 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (2006).
170 Id. § 512(C)(1)(C).
171 Id. § 512(c)(3)(B)(ii).
172 Scholars have since noted that the "knowing material misrepresentation" standard "is a
difficult standard to meet." Urban & Quilter, supra note 143, at 639.
[VOL. 7:1
SCHONAUER
insufficient under § 512(C)(3)(A)(v) would mean that the copyright
holder did not have a good faith belief that the use of the material in
the manner complained of was not authorized; in other words,
subjectively, the copyright owner believed the use of the material was
authorized by itself or the law. If the copyright owner believed that
the use of the material was authorized by itself or the law, then it
follows that it must actually know that it is making a material
misrepresentation that the activity is infringing. Therefore, acts
violative of § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) would be at least a subset of the acts that
would violate § 512(f). And, because two groups cannot be subsets of
each other without being equal to each other, § 512(f) would
essentially be a cause of action for a violation of § 512(c)(3)(A)(v).
Had Congress intended this result, it could have done so expressly,
and would not have used markedly different language in the two
subsections.
The § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) standard of knowledge defines the
effectiveness of a takedown notice, and its effect on ISP liability. The §
512(f) standard defines the level of misrepresentation necessary to
create liability for takedown notice misuse and abuse. Their purposes
are very different, and should be interpreted in these distinct contexts.
Congress could have intended that both standards be identical. That
conclusion, however, is not justifiable in light of the vastly different
language of the subsections.
One of the justifications given by the Rossi Court for its reading of
the statute was that Congress could have expressly incorporated an
objective standard of reasonableness into § 512(c).173 This may be
true; Congress likely intended the § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) requirement to be
subject to normal subjective good faith standards. In that case, a
determination of the effectiveness of a notice, or the knowledge
imputed to an ISP, should be based upon the subjective belief of the
copyright owner. However, this argument undermines Rossi's
subsequent reading of § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) and § 512(f) together. Had
Congress intended for § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) to usurp an independent
reading of § 512(f), it could have written the provision in such a
manner. For example, the provision could have been drafted to state
"Any person who, without a good faith belief, materially misrepresents
under this section... ." It could also have been based solely on a
finding of a violation of § 512(c)(3)(A)(v). The fact that Congress
included a different standard into § 512(f) demonstrates that its cause
of action is founded upon a standard of knowledge independent from
173 Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1004.
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§ 512(c)(3)(A). Section 512(f) was intended to be a standalone
provision, meant to protect end users and copyright owners from
inappropriate uses of the quite powerful and due process deficient
DMCA takedown procedures.174
Even if one concedes that statutory provisions are often read
together to determine the meaning of a particular provision, the Rossi
court should have read subsections 512(c)(3)(A)(ii)-(iii) as the
applicable related provisions. The language of subsections (ii) and
(iii) track the § 512(f) infringement language more closely. The
standard in § 512(f) looks for "knowing material misrepresentation" of
infringement;175 subsections (ii) and (iii) likewise deal with
identification "of the copyright work claimed to have been
infringed"176 and "of the material that is claimed to be infringing."177
No mention of a knowledge standard in these subsections guides a
reading of § 512(f). Subsection (v), on the other hand, instructs the
copyright holder to make a "good faith belief that the use of the
material is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the
law."'78 Therefore, when looking for guidance on an interpretation of
knowing misrepresentation of infringement, subsection (v) yields no
assistance.
However, it is certainly understandable that, when confronted
with a chance to interpret § 512(c)(3)(A)(v), the Rossi Court looked to
a related subsection that imposed liability for abuses of the system
installed by § 512. After all, § 512(c)(3)(A) contains a list of
requirements, and one could postulate that an interpretation of the
liability provision in § 512(f) would hinge on the violation of a list of
requirements elsewhere in the statute. Looking at § 512 more closely,
however, indicates that § 512(c) and § 512(f) simply serve different
purposes. A reading of § 512(f) need not be dependent upon a
violation of § 512(c)(3)(A). To be sure, a copyright owner's violation
of § 512(c)(3)(A) could have evidentiary weight in a § 512(f) action, but
to say that it is dependent belies the fact that § 512(f) can be used
against copyright owners, as well as ISPs and end users, as §
512(c)(3)(A) applies only to copyright owners.
174 See supra discussion accompanying notes 139-42.
175 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2006)
176 Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).
177 Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) (emphasis added).
178 Id. § 512(C)(3)(A)(v) (emphasis added).
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Furthermore, the Rossi Court turned to § 512(f) when searching
for a related statutory provision to assist its interpretation of §
512(c)(3)(A)(v). It did not seek § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) in response to a need
to interpret § 512(f). Had it done so, it might have looked to §
512(c)(1)(A)(i), which demands that a service provider "not have
actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on
the system or network is infringing." The recent Viacom Int'l Inc. v.
YouTube, Inc. decision interpreted that provision, but in the context
of whether "[g]eneral knowledge that infringement is 'ubiquitous'
imposes a duty on an ISP to monitor or search its services for
infringement. It held that it does not. It is quite interesting to note,
however, that Congress included the "actual" modifier to the
knowledge in this subsection - indicating that had they intended §
512(f) to have similar effect, they would have included the same
modifier.
A thorough analysis of the Rossi decision yields one of two
possibilities. Perhaps the court referenced the § 512(f) "knowing
misrepresentation" standard in passing, as further support for its
decision that the "good faith standard" in § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) should be a
subjective one. This is possible, especially considering the
unsympathetic plaintiff in the case before it, making it understandable
if the court was attempting to make it clear that Rossi would not win.
In that case, subsequent decisions may have read the case incorrectly,
placing too much emphasis on dicta in the court's holding.
Alternatively, the court may have had something to say about the
potential strength of the recent Diebold interpretation and chose to do
something about it, even though the case before them had nothing to
do with § 512(f) whatsoever. 179
Courts should interpret § 512(f) actions, as in Diebold, as valid
actions if the complaining party can show that a "party actually knew,
should have known if it acted with reasonable care or diligence, or
would have had no substantial doubt had it been acting in good faith,
that it was making a misrepresentation."180 A party having actual
knowledge that it is making a misrepresentation is already liable
under the act. Additionally, analyzing the facts in Rossi under this
standard would result in the same outcome as the court reached in
that case. The MPAA clearly did not have actual knowledge that
Rossi's website contained no infringing material. They also clearly did
179 See Bleech, supra note 154, at 263 ("The application of a subjective standard of good
faith by the court is merely judicial activism.").
18o Diebold, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1204.
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not meet the "should have known" portion of the standard, because in
this case, Rossi's website was a subscription site that blatantly
advertised that it made infringing material available to users. While
courts would be free to construct the contours of reasonable care and
diligence, it is probable (and desirable) that copyright owners should
not be required to pay money to suspected infringers just to obtain the
actual knowledge necessary to file a DMCA notice. This is a concern
the Rossi Court may have had in mind when it attempted to whittle
down the breadth of the misrepresentation actions.18 1
Neither would the MPAA have been liable under the third prong of
the Diebold standard, for having no substantial doubt had it acted in
good faith that it was making a misrepresentation. This portion of the
standard is reserved for copyright holders that intentionally create the
absence of knowledge in bad faith. A court would have to find that the
copyright holder subjectively took steps to avoid knowledge that it
was making an infringement. For example, had Rossi advertised on
the front page of his website that pirated movies were available for
downloading, and did not charge a subscription fee for access, and the
MPAA had not attempted to download any movies or enter the site
(and thus determine that there was no infringing activity), the MPAA
would have violated § 512(f) only if the court found that the MPAA
acted in bad faith by not investigating further. This portion of the
standard would give courts the latitude to determine, not only the
proper burden to place on copyright owners with respect to their
investigatory duties, but also whether a finding of bad faith under §
512(c)(3)(A)(v) could be used as evidence of a knowing
misrepresentation. Thus, Universal's failure to consider Lenz's fair
use could result in § 512(f) liability under this prong.
The interpretation would still leave open the possibility that
mistaken DMCA notices produced by fully automated searching and
notice issuance programs would fall short of "reasonable care or
diligence." Rights holders could then be incentivized to keep better
records of their searches and enforcement procedures. This in turn
would make discovery available to DMCA notice recipients with
respect to copyright owner practices and procedures, which would
chill abuses of the DMCA procedures for fear of liability.
This standard would also stop the Michael Crooks of the world,
although he may have been found liable regardless, had the case not
settled. Certainly, with reasonable diligence, Crook could have
181 Some have pointed out that Rossi was a very unsympathetic plaintiff and the case did
not involve free speech or fair use implications, perhaps partially the reason behind the
court's ruling. Koss, supra note 87, 163.
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determined that he made a misrepresentation because he was not the
owner of the copyrighted work. This standard would also stop some
situations, mentioned in conjunction with the music blog incident on
Blogger, in which the marketing arm of an entity failed to coordinate
with the rights enforcement arm, resulting in a mistakenly issued
DMCA takedown notice. The onus of such mistakes must fall on the
copyright owner, not the innocent end user.182
If the courts do not appear willing to adopt this proposal, I urge
Congress to amend § 512(f) as follows:
(f) Misrepresentation - Any person who k. -k i gly
actually knew or should have known if it acted with
reasonable care or diligence, or would have had no
substantial doubt had it been acting in good faith, that
it was materially. r ....eft misrepresenting under
this section-
(i) that material or activity is infringing; or
(2) that material or activity was removed or disabled by
mistake or misidentification,
shall be liable for any damages, including costs and
attorneys fees, incurred by the alleged infringer, by any
copyright owner or copyright owner's authorized
licensee, or by a service provider, who is injured by
such misrepresentation, as the result of the service
provider relying upon such misrepresentation in
removing or disabling access to the material or activity
claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the removed
material or ceasing to disable access to it.
B. MANDATORY ATTORNEY'S FEES
182 Some authors suggest that chilling effects from DMCA takedown abuses are over
exaggerated. See Edward Lee, Warming Up to User Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1459, 1543-44 (2008). However, even if the abuse of DMCA takedown notices does
not produce a chilling effect that Urban cautions against, the ability for copyright owners to
single out certain end users for punishment is not fair to individual users who seek to use
copyrighted works in accordance with accepted norms.
2011]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
In addition to changing the standard of knowledge required for a
misrepresentation action, I propose the addition of a Fair Use
Strengthening Act ("FUSA"), to be amended and codified as § 512(0).
The FUSA would seek to empower "private attorney generals ' in much
the same manner as the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of
1976183 and the Clean Water Act.184 FUSA would state as follows:
(o) Attorney and Expert Fees and Costs - (a) In
any action or proceeding in which the user of a
copyrighted work asserts a fair use defense to a claim of
copyright infringement and prevails, the court shall
award a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of the
action in additional to any other remedies that may be
recovered in the action.
(b) In awarding attorney's fees under subsection (a) of
this section in any action or proceeding, the court, in its
discretion, may include expert fees as part of the
attorney fees and costs.
By amending the DMCA to include a private attorney general
provision, there would be a de facto strengthening of the fair use
doctrine in the context of digital works and its online use. Many of the
cases discussed above in Part II regarding abuses of the takedown
procedures and many other similar cases appear to frequently involve
uses that would support a strong argument in favor of fair use. Quite
often, the uses are not only likely to be fair use, but are marginal uses;
they have no commercial impact on the market for the copyrighted
work. Therefore, once a commercially quantifiable risk is introduced
into the notice procedure, copyright owners will have a disincentive to
issue notices involving marginal uses.
Just providing vindicators of fair use rights with fee
reimbursement might not be enough in itself. However, one must
consider the incentive that such a statute would provide to lawyers
practicing in the copyright law field. Experienced, well-known
attorneys and advocacy groups would be incentivized to use their
expertise to litigate cases in which they would have the opportunity to
further shape the contours of the fair use doctrine with a victory, while
183 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006).
184 See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006).
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simultaneously earning a living. Many commentators lament that fair
use is uncertain, and therefore not very useful. This would also
provide the opportunity to further refine the contours of the fair use
doctrine by actually encouraging litigation in cases of abuse, thus
incrementally defining the doctrine of fair use.
CONCLUSION
Twelve years have passed since the inception of the DMCA. Since
that beginning, we have witnessed a fascinatingly robust growth of the
Internet and digital communication. The DMCA plays a significant
role in the economic and social successes that we see. In particular, it
grants far more certainty as to liability for copyright infringement to
ISPs-something that was a major concern before the enactment of
the DMCA. It likewise gives powerful rights enforcement mechanisms
to copyright holders, enabling them to respond quickly to unlawful
digital use of their works. Unfortunately, these strong protections
result in the abuse of these mechanisms by some, spoiling the party
for some end users that need legitimate protection. By strengthening
the misrepresentation action through a relaxed knowledge standard
and fee shifting to encourage the defense of fair uses and discourage
the issuance of notices for marginal uses, the DMCA could finally
boast that it protects all parties at the table adequately and fairly.
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